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A security dilemma is a situation where the actions taken by a state to increase its own security 
cause reactions from other states, which leads to a decrease rather than an increase in the state’s 
security. Some scholars of international relations find that the security dilemma is the most 
important source of conflict in international relations. They argue that in the international realm 
there is no legitimate monopoly of violence – i.e. there is no world government - and as a 
consequence each state must take care of its own security and survival. For this reason the primary 
goal of states is to maximize their own security. Even if states focus solely on this goal and have no 
intention of harming others, many of the actions taken by states to increase their own security – e.g. 
weapons procurement and the development of new military technologies - will decrease the security 
of others. Decreasing the security of others does not automatically place the state in a dilemma, but 
because of the anarchic structure, other states will follow suit, if one state arms. They cannot know 
whether the arming state will use its increased military capabilities for attack in the future. For this 
reason they will either choose to increase their own military capabilities in order to reestablish the 
balance of power, or they will launch a preemptive attack in order to prevent the arming state from 
upsetting the balance in the first place. If they choose the first option, the result may be a security 
spiral. A security spiral is an action-reaction process, where two states are tied in an armaments race 
with each state responding to increases in weapons procurement and defense expenditure by the 
other state leading them both to arm more and more heavily. This may lead to war in the long run. If 
they choose the last option, military conflict will be imminent. 
The logic of the security dilemma was first described Herbert Butterfield in 1949. The 
term was coined by John Hertz in 1950. Although the logic seems to fit particularly well with the 
security competition between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
proponents of the term do not see it as tied to a specific historic era. Rather it reflects the 
fundamentally tragic nature of international life: state actors strive for peace and stability, but end 
up in military conflict. Thus, even if all states are status quo powers wishing only peace and 
security, war may occur, because of the fear and insecurity following from the anarchic structure of 
the international system. This focus on the effect of international anarchy on the behavior of states 
is typical of so-called structural realism – sometimes termed neorealism – which posits that the 
international system is a self-help system, where states must focus on their own interests in order to 
maximize their chance of security and survival. In particular, the security dilemma logic is central 
to so-called defensive realism. Proponents of defensive realism argue that states seek to maximize 
their chance of security and survival by maintaining their position in the international system, not 
by expansion. Still, scholars working within alternative theoretical traditions have discussed how 
the security dilemma logic looks from their perspective and utilized their own theoretical insights to 
suggest how we might move beyond the security dilemma logic and create a more peaceful world. 
A large number of International Relations scholars have applied and developed the 
logic of the security dilemma. Some of the most prominent security dilemma scholars are Robert 
Jervis, Barry Posen and Charles Glaser. From a more critical stance, the security dilemma logic has 
been explored by among others Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler. Recent research on the security 
dilemma has applied the logic to most regions of the world and resulted in a proliferation of more 
fine-grained distinctions between different types of security dilemmas. 
Some scholars of international relations argue that all states face a security dilemma 
all of the time, but most of them agree that the intensity of security dilemmas tend to vary over time 
and space. The literature on international relations points to different sources of variation in the 
security dilemma. Security scholars such as Stephen Van Evera, argue the intensity of the security 
dilemma depends on the ease of conquest. If conquest is easy, states will typically face an intense 
security dilemma, because the risk of military defeat is raised every time a competing state adds to 
its military capabilities. Conversely, if conquest is difficult the security dilemma is ameliorated, 
because other states may add to their military capabilities without posing a direct offensive threat. If 
we are able to tell the difference between offensive and defensive weapons, states may even signal 
their benign intentions by deploying defensive weapons. Other states will know that they have 
acquired weapons not to attack, but to defend. Offense and defense dominance vary over time and 
space depending on a number of factors including geography, military technology and military 
doctrine. 
Also, regime type may affect the intensity of the security dilemma. Although 
democracies often go to war, they rarely go to war against other democracies. When two 
autocracies face each other or when a democracy and an autocracy face each other, security spirals 
sometimes spin out of control, because each side interprets the move by the other side as potentially 
threatening. But this is rarely the case when two democracies face each other. Two characteristics 
of modern, stable democracies explain why. First, the policy processes in liberal democracies is 
fairly transparent, even when viewed from outside the country. Parliamentary debates are usually 
open to the public – sometimes even televised – and political parties outside government, mass 
media and interest groups ensure that few government decisions of any importance are taken 
without scrutiny and public debate. Second, democracies usually have rules and regulations 
preventing them from rushing into war. Some policies are made extraordinarily difficult thereby 
binding the policy makers and signaling to the outside world that decisions cannot be taken without 
prior warning. Both of these characteristics of modern liberal democracies reduce uncertainty, and 
thereby ameliorate the security dilemma. As summed up by Charles Lipson ‘[B]ecause democracies 
have more accurate perceptions of each other, they are better able to cooperate, build trust and avoid 
war’ (Lipson 2003: 72). 
Other scholars argue that the security dilemma is largely irrelevant, because 
international conflict is not the result of status quo powers seeking to maximize security, but of 
revisionist powers seeking to maximize power. If all states are status quo powers, these critics 
argue, then military conflict would be extremely rare, because the world would consist of status 
quo-powers eager to signal their benign intentions. But this is not the case: states wishing to expand 
their power at the expense of others are the most important source of military conflict in 
international relations, not the uncertainty and insecurity of status quo powers. 
Today, military conflict between states is less frequent than throughout most of the 
world’s history. At the same time conflict related to weak and failed states is now a major source of 
instability in many parts of the world. Some scholars argue that even though this development 
seems to fit uneasily with the idea of unitary state actors stuck in a security dilemma in an anarchic 
international system, the basic logic of the security dilemma may still be applied. For instance, 
Barry Posen, analyzing ethnic violence between ethnic groups in collapsing Yugoslavia in the early 
1990s finds that Serbs and Croats experienced a security dilemma in an emerging anarchy where 
each group had to take care of its own security. Brian Job extends the applicability of the security 
dilemma even further by discussing how a similar logic applies to weak Third World states unable 
to provide security for their own citizens and sometimes even constituting a threat to parts of the 
population. 
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